Legislative priorities

One of the main reasons for carrying out a Formal Investigation into a shipping disaster is to determine its causes so that safety lessons can be learned and action taken to prevent similar tragedies re-occurring. Following the Gaul and Derbyshire inquiries we have found out, however, that this is not really the case: the protection of the financial interests of a few political and corporate operators have primacy over all other considerations, including safety.

In the run up to the 2004 Gaul and 2000 Derbyshire formal investigations, and subsequently, a lot of public money was spent and a lot of work was carried out in order to determine the causes of these two maritime disasters and to propose new measures that would improve safety. The causes for the tragedies were well obscured and, as for the safety measures recommended during those two inquiries, when it came to the final stage - the implementation or concrete action stage – matters, somehow, fizzled out.

Trawler Gaul lost in 1974 with all 36 crew

It is doubtful whether the four safety recommendations that came out of the Gaul 2004 Re-opened Formal Investigation (RFI) will ever come into effect. They had not been implemented in January 2007 when we first raised this matter [link] and they have not been implemented since.

The fact that the four safety recommendations, put forward by Justice Steel (the Wreck Commissioner in the Gaul RFI), are based upon false premises, are inappropriate and will therefore not be effective in preventing future loss of life, may be one of the reasons why the Government prefers them to be shelved and quietly forgotten.

OBO MV Derbyshire lost in 1980 with all 44 persons onboard

The Formal Investigation into the loss of the MV Derbyshire concluded in 2000 and its final report was published on 8 November of that year. The principal finding and recommendation to come out from the Derbyshire RFI was that the regulations for hatch cover strength were seriously deficient and that the International Convention on Load Lines (1966) needed to be amended urgently to rectify this shortfall.

The regulations of the Load Line Convention were thus redrafted at IMO to include requirements for specially strengthened hatch covers to be fitted to the forward cargo holds of all new cargo ships (not only bulk carriers). The new amendments were finalised at IMO [*] in 2002 and came into force Internationally in 2005.

However, they did not legally come into force for UK flagged vessels at the same time because the UK’s own Merchant Shipping legislation had not been amended to give legal force to the new Load Line Convention requirements for hatch covers. Today, the legislation still has not been revised.

The relevant UK rules are contained in Statutory Instrument (SI) 1998 No. 2241: The Merchant Shipping (Load Line) Regulations 1998.

There is no reason why these rules could not have been amended in a timely manner; in fact, the UK Load Line regulations were recently modified by Statutory Instrument (SI) 2005 No. 2114, so as to implement the following changes:

“……… in the definition of "pleasure vessel" or "pleasure craft", as the case may be, for each reference to "husband or wife" substitute "spouse or civil partner".

Now, that was extremely important - and also revealing of our government’s legislative priorities as regards Maritime safety.

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[*] International Maritime Organisation

Safety and Profitability

On the 18th of February 1974, in an interview with ITN News, David Shenton, the National Fisheries Officer for the Transport and General Workers Union, said that lack of evidence [1] about what had happened to the Hull trawler Gaul on the day it disappeared could cost the families of her 36 crewmen as much as £312,000 each [2] .

His statement [3], made just 10 days after the loss of the vessel, managed to crystallise, in a few words, the crux of the matter, which, for the next 35 years, would deny the general public the facts behind the vessel’s loss, and the families of the crew the right to know what happened to their loved ones.

It is now evident that it was not a submarine, a cold war spy-ship encounter, official secrets or hijack and capture by the Russians that had prevented the truth about this tragedy from emerging (these were just convenient ‘red herrings’ made up for the excitement of the public); it was money - purely and simply - and the British Establishment’s unwillingness to pay what amounted to a considerable sum, even though this was proper, fair and legally due to the victims’ families.

The reluctance of both governments and private companies to pay legal damages to injured parties is well-known, and has a long and colourful history in the maritime business world; what is particularly sickening, however, in the Gaul and other recent cases is the shoddiness of the tactics employed to circumvent the law: the cynical setbacks, the unnecessary delays, the long and costly legal battles, the blatant lies and, despite the recent disclosures, the persistent suppression of the truth, all of which go far beyond reasonable prudence and concern for the interests of shareholders and taxpayers.

But what is, perhaps, even more disturbing is the ease, the audacity and the extent to which the ‘cartel’ of politicians, businesses, insurers, civil servants, law firms and the judiciary are nowadays prepared to collude in order to prevent the payment of lawful compensation to those who have suffered such terrible losses.

In the Gaul case, this collusion led to a dubious but costly public inquiry, which, contrary to the available evidence, laid the blame for the tragedy with the crew.

A decade ago, in the debate about the limitation of liability for the maritime industry, justice David Steel placed himself firmly on the side of the shipping and insurance industries, whose financial interests he considered more important than fair compensation to claimants for damages caused by shipping mishaps.

The same justice Steel was then appointed to chair the 2004 Re-opened Formal Investigation into the sinking of the Gaul, which, surprisingly, found no fault with the vessel and, therefore, no grounds for subsequent compensation claims by the victims’ families.

Of course, a fine balance between safety and profitability has to be struck, no one wants the shipping or the insurance industries to go bust, but “at no time should any innocent party be expected to subsidize any business by their personal loss”, [4] nor should a formal legal process to be turned into a farce.

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[1] Simply put, as long as there was no firm evidence concerning the loss of the Gaul, liability could not be established and there could be no compensation for the dependents.

[2] About £3.5million in present day worth

[3] Unfortunately the families were soon to lose their champion as Mr Shenton passed away shortly thereafter. Mr James Johnson paid the following tribute to Mr Shenton in the House of Commons on 5 April 1976: “The late David Shenton, National Fisheries Officer for the Transport and General Workers' Union—whose untimely death is a great loss to the industry—did a great deal for the fishermen in Hull.”

[4] Serge Killingbeck, SCU Law Review Volume 3 November 1999

Initial comments

Critical comments on the findings of the Re-Opened Formal Investigation (RFI) into the loss of the trawler Gaul

Following a careful study of the report into the loss of the trawler Gaul published in December 2004, at the end of the RFI, (http://www.fv-gaul.org.uk/), a number of questions and objections as to its content and conclusions arise.

In essence, the inquiry concluded that human error on the part of the crew, shore maintenance staff and the vessel's owners was the cause of the vessel's loss.

In this post, it is suggested that what actually led to loss of the vessel was a design fault in the construction and arrangements of the duff and offal chute openings and their means of closure.

The RFI conclusions in brief

1. That the Gaul capsized and sank in severe weather following undetected seawater ingress into the factory space. The water entered this space through two hull side chute openings[1].
2. That each of these two hull side chute openings had two means of closure: an outer non-return flap valve and a hinged inner cover; and that both of these closures were open prior to, and during the loss of the vessel. 
3.  That, as a result of inadequate shore-side maintenance, both outer flap valves had become seized in the open position due to corrosion in their hinges, and that they had been in this condition since the time of the vessel’s departure from Hull, 16 days prior to the accident;
4. That the hinged inner covers had been left open and unsecured by the crew; and 
5. That, had the crew closed the inner covers, this would have been sufficient to prevent the loss of the vessel.
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[1] These chutes facilitated the overboard discharge of duff and offal waste resulting from fish processing operations within the factory space.
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The design fault

The duff and offal chute openings in the hull of the vessel were provided with a two-barrier closure system: an outer non-return flap (the strength barrier) and an inner cover (the leakage barrier), and these were both required to be closed in order to maintain the hull’s full watertight integrity.

Unfortunately, it can be demonstrated that the outer non-return flap arrangement, which was present onboard the Gaul was such that, in certain circumstances, the sea could act directly on the exposed free edge of this outer flap and push it open. In such circumstancess, if the inner covers had also been open or had subsequently failed[2] , the seawater would have been able to enter the vessel unhindered. 

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[2] It should be mentioned here that the inner covers were neither designed nor intended to withstand, on their own, the forces of the sea

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For a pictorial explanation of the design defect on the Gaul, please follow this link:
http://webzoom.freewebs.com/inconvenientcitizen/Gaul%20design%20fault.pdf

This shows that a slightly different design arrangement of the outer non-return flaps would have prevented the rapid flooding of the Gaul, even with the inner covers left fully open.

Possible causes for the loss of the Gaul

The Re-opened Formal Investigation came to the conclusion that the outer non-return flaps in the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul had been seized in the open position since the time of the vessel’s departure from port - this conclusion having been drawn from the fact that the flaps were found to be in the open position during the 2002 underwater survey.

The fact that the inner covers were also found to be open during this survey was ascribed to the crew’s failure to close them.

In his closing remarks the judge stated firmly that "no other possible causes remained open".

The document published HERE shows that not only was this incorrect but that there are other more plausible explanations for the loss of the vessel:

Other aspects and questions

Linked to the above issues, there are also a number of elements within the formal report which appear incorrect: 1. When defining the scope of ship classification, the formal report failed to include the Classification Societies’ responsibility for watertight integrity. The definition within the report reads:

“Class/classification = covers the development and worldwide implementation of published rules and regulations which will provide for: 1. The structural strength and scantlings of all essential parts of the hull and its appendages; ......”

While the definition as per IACS – Quality management System requirements manual states in respect of “Classification service” point 1. that

“The structural strength (and where necessary the watertight integrity of) all essential parts of the exterior boundaries of the ship or offshore installation and its appendages.”

Why was the alteration of this international definition necessary in the formal report?

2. The definitions provided in the formal report for weathertight and watertight properties read as follows:

“Watertight – impervious to the passage of water, as applied to ship’s structure, closures and joints. A watertight opening is so constructed that when closed, it will prevent water under pressure from passing through, and normally incorporates a gasket.”


“Weathertight – capable of being sealed to exclude water in normal sea conditions. A weathertight opening is typically designed to keep out rain and spray only.”

Whereas watertight and weathertight are terms that have agreed International definitions such that items which are categorised and accepted as watertight or weathertight need to meet strict requirements for construction, strength, material thickness, gasketing, hinges and securing clips (these are generally set by National or International standard).

“Watertight means capable of preventing the passage of water through the structure in either direction with a proper margin of resistance under the pressure due to the maximum head of water, which it might have to sustain.”


“Weathertight means that in any sea conditions water will not penetrate into the ship.” (SOLAS 1974 as amended, 1966 Load Line Convention and Torremolinos Convention 1977)

Why were the definitions for watertight and weathertight used in the report incorrect?

Thus, a weathertight fitting should be designed to withstand, in any sea conditions, water pressure and prevent the passage of water from one side only. A watertight fitting, on the other hand, must, when closed, prevent the passage of water through an opening no matter which side is under pressure.

Since the adequacy and functioning of the ship’s duff and offal chute fittings was central to the investigation, has not their confusing definition been a serious failing?

Why have the inner covers of the Gaul’s duff and offal chutes been categorised throughout the report as being of a ‘watertight’ standard, whilst, in reality, the construction, strength and arrangement of these inner covers would not even meet the requirements that would be expected for ‘weathertight’ closures?

Watertight and weathertight fittings generally make use of rubber gaskets and clips (or bolts) to seal steel-to-steel joints and prevent the passage of water. Watertight fittings need many more bolts/clips than weathertight fittings. The principle shortfall in the strength of the chute’s inner covers is related to their direction of opening when considered in conjunction with external sea pressure loading (full sea loading on the covers would only be resisted by 3 butterfly nuts, instead of the overlapped gasketed steel plating arrangement that is normally associated with a weathertight joint). 3. It is also stated in the report that:

“it is not clear how the spindle could have been repaired or replaced should the need arise without burning off the balance weight from the connecting arms”

However, the construction drawings for the duff and offal chutes show quite clearly that the hinge, spindle, balance weight and connecting arms can be readily dismantled for maintenance, repairs or replacements. (?!)

4. Is it not the case that, if the inquiry had found that the Gaul had sunk due to a design defect, the victims’ families would have been entitled to compensation?

Extract from The Merchant Shipping (Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims) (Amendment) Order 1998:

" 1. The limits of liability for claims other than those mentioned in Article 7, arising on any distinct occasion, shall be calculated as follows: (a) in respect of claims for loss of life or personal injury, (i) 2 million Units of Account for a ship with a tonnage not exceeding 2,000 tons,”

This would amount today to approx. 3m USD per life lost (1 SDR = 1.48727 USD)

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For those who wish to read the full technical argument behind the above points, please visit the following site:

http://www.freewebs.com/inconvenientcitizen