Another bent thing and more damning evidence

If the evidence we have published so far may have presented “an ostensibly compelling case”, to use Mr Jim Fitzpatrick’s expression from a recent letter, the evidence we will be publishing from now on should provide the Minister for Transport with extra certainty. As, in the same letter, he claimed that the information we presented did not constitute the whole picture – a claim with which, for probably different reasons, we agree - we have decided to show you more of that ‘picture’.

In previous posts we have already argued that the RFI assessment, that the inner lids of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul had been left open by the crew prior to the loss of the vessel, was unsound. The condition of the closing devices of the duff chute indicates that its inner cover was, in fact, closed when the tragedy struck.

We can now reveal that the split covers of the offal chute were also closed. The images below, captured from the 2002 underwater survey film footage, illustrate that the bar attached to one of the offal split covers, as their means of closure, was found in its place and deformed in a way consistent with it having undergone strong pressure from the underside.

This finding, which the RFI panel was aware of, supports the proposition that the inner lids of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul had initially been closed by the crew, but were burst open by the force of the incoming waves, at the time of the loss.

We have also constructed a model of the offal chute and tested it against the effects of water pressure acting on the underside of its inner lids. We used this model to replicate the damage to the securing bar, as observed in the images from the wreck of the Gaul. The photo below shows the result.

More to come...

Elastic conclusions and the re-writing of history

In an earlier POST we already mentioned one embellishment contained in a paper produced by the experts in the 2004 Gaul RFI.

In that same paper, drawn up as a summary of the results of the formal investigation, the experts also went a step beyond the official findings and stated with conviction:

“There was no logical reason why the duff and offal chute lids were secured in the open position, whilst dodging, other than crew error. It is also difficult to understand why the flap valves were jammed in the open position other than bad maintenance onboard or ashore.”

The authors were, of course, well aware of the fact that the offal chute lids had not been found secured in the open position. They were also aware that it was only around the duff chute lid that some kind of ‘ligature’ had been seen hanging and, therefore, one could not truthfully say that both the duff and the offal chute lids had been secured open by the crew of the Gaul.

The RFI final report, having been drawn up by better-versed legal minds, went only as far as advising that:

“In the case of the duff chute, the single lid was apparently secured in the open position by some form of ligature and in the case of the offal chute the split lid was found with the forward half open and the aft half closed, but not secured.”

The RFI experts must have also realised that any future interested parties would be more likely to read their free paper rather than the costly and voluminous RFI report, and that their words may therefore be taken as fact.

In the light our previous post and the above observations we would ask our readers the following question: What can one make of these exaggerations, which, it so happened, had the effect of adding undeserved weight to the Court’s ‘crew error’ verdict?

Clues and toggles

In continuation of our post of March 09, we are now publishing a DOCUMENT, which points to some differences and similarities in the ways in which the re-opened formal investigations (RFIs) into two major marine accidents: the MV Derbyshire and FV Gaul have been conducted and the reasons why the first was able to deliver better quality results than the second.

We considered the formal investigation into the loss of the MV Derbyshire, in which, initially, the Assessors wrongly concluded - on the basis of a rope seen emerging from the Bosun’s store hatch opening and of a simple examination of the disposition of that hatch’s toggles - that the loss of the vessel had been due to crew error.

In a curiously similar manner, the Gaul RFI also put the blame for the loss of the trawler on the crew, who, the RFI panel claimed, had neglected to close the inner covers to two openings in the hull - this time on the basis of a ligature apparently holding the vessel’s duff chute inner lid in the open position.

However, as the Derbyshire Assessors’ report had been made public two years prior to the RFI court hearings, their findings were openly examined and contested when appropriate and this allowed the court to arrive, in the end, at a set of different and more robust conclusions.

What is worthy of note here is that, in the Derbyshire RFI, it was the subsequent examination by independent experts of the condition and position of the Bosun’s hatch cover’s toggles that led to the rebuttal of the Assessors’ initial verdict of crew error.
Finally, the court concluded that the crew had not failed to secure the hatch lid and that the rope emerging from the Bosun’s store hatch opening was nothing more than post-casualty debris.

Unfortunately, despite the precedent provided by the Derbyshire inquiry, during the Gaul inquiry no external, independent examination of the case was allowed.
In the Gaul Investigation, the report of the Assessors, the retained experts and the court was presented at the end of the RFI as one final document, ‘set in stone’. Nonetheless, a mere glance at the position of the toggles, as shown by the underwater survey footage, suggests that the inner lids of both chutes on the Gaul had been initially closed.

Surprisingly, during the court hearings, neither the strongback bar (which, in conjunction with two toggles, secured the offal chute cover) nor the condition of the toggles was even mentioned. In addition to and more intriguingly than this oversight is, however, the creative, ‘non-figurative’ manner in which the retained experts produced the drawings of the duff and offal chutes, in their supposedly ‘as found’ condition.

The toggles, which in the underwater survey video footage are clearly shown to be in the ‘hatch closed’ position, appear on the experts’ drawings to be in the ‘hatch open’ position.

The unfortunate effect of these inaccuracies is that it can mislead subsequent examiners into concluding that, since all the toggles were found in the ‘open’ position on the wreck, the court’s finding that the crew had left the hatches open prior to the loss of the vessel is most likely correct.

More about it HERE

Another piece of misleading evidence

An important plank in the Attorney General’s case against the crew of the Gaul was the instilled notion that they were not experienced in operating trawlers fitted with hull openings for the discharge of fish processing waste.

The case made was that, because the crew had no experience of such ships, they would not have been able to appreciate the importance of such openings in relation to the vessel’s stability and watertight integrity. Their subsequent ‘errors’ in not maintaining the duff and offal chute’s flaps and ‘forgetting’ to close the inner covers could thus be more readily explained.

The Attorney General’s team developed this theme throughout the course of the hearings (see extracts from the transcripts of evidence in the DOCUMENT ATTACHED), and even went as far as providing a detailed general arrangement drawing for the freezer trawler Cassio (Appendix 7 of the final report), which showed, they said, that duff and offal chutes had not been fitted on that vessel.

A small point to note:

A ship’s general arrangement drawing carries a level of detail that is decided by the draughtsman with clarity, aesthetical and presentational aspects being important considerations. The general arrangement drawing that was presented as evidence to the Gaul RFI merely confirmed that duff and offal chute openings had not been indicated on that drawing, it did not confirm that they had not been provided on the vessel.

In a 1966 photograph of the Othello, possibly on sea trials, its duff and offal discharges, cut in the hull on the port side, can be seen just aft of the funnel and near to the waterline.

The freezer stern trawlers Cassio, Othello and Orsino were sister vessels, built by Yarrows of Glasgow in 1966. The Gaul’s Skipper, Peter Nellist, sailed on both the Cassio and the Orsino, while the Mate, Maurice Spurgeon, had sailed on the Othello immediately prior to joining the Gaul on her last voyage.

Lack of strength

We have previously mentioned that the inner covers of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul were not designed to be of watertight standard. Our post of 24 September 2007 states that the inner covers of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul were not watertight, nor were they supposed to be so, and, even closed, they could not have been relied upon to maintain the watertight integrity of the vessel.

We would now like to explain that the main reason why the inner covers on the Gaul were not of a ‘watertight’ standard is because they were deficient in strength.That is the hinges, toggle bolts and steel lugs – the only parts of the covers, which provided the strength or resistance against the forces of the sea – were inadequate.

The paper published HERE gives the details.

A second design error

So far, we have revealed that there were two design faults and one, what we would call, error in the in the design of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul:

The principal design fault (for details, see this LINKED DOCUMENT and this VIDEO CLIP), related to the construction and arrangement of the chutes, meant that the non-return flaps in the duff and offal chutes on the vessel could have been opened by the action of the sea

The second design fault showed the possibility for the bolted assemblies of the non-return flaps to become twisted due to the force of the sea, and remain open thereafter (further details can be found at this LINK).

The design error described in our post of 26 June 2007 was a dimensioning mistake in the shipyard’s construction drawing which, in certain circumstances, could have caused the flap to jam in the open position, after having been opened under the action of the sea. (For further explanations please follow this LINK)

Now, we are presenting yet another design error (explained HERE as well as HERE): a miscalculation of the relative weights of the components of the chutes’ non return flaps, the consequence of which meant that a wave load of only 7.5 kg could have been enough to force them open.

It should be noted that the design of ‘non-return flaps’ within the duff and offal chutes should have enabled them to withstand the forces of the sea, close automatically and prevent water ingress. However, as a result of the inadequacies listed above, the action of the sea could have caused the flaps to fail in their main functions.

Thus, it is evident that the design of the Gaul’s chutes was vitiated by multiple flaws (and, we warn you, there is more to come) and that the unfortunate nature of these flaws was such that they augmented each other’s effects, rendering the vessel unacceptably vulnerable to flooding and capsizing.

A design error

"18.17... it is important to note that although both chutes were found on the wreck to be open both in way of the non-return flap and the internal top cover, there is no known mechanical reason why this was so." (Report of the 2004 Re-opened Formal Investigation into the Loss of the FV Gaul)

In the paper describing the MAIN DESIGN FAULT on the Gaul, we gave an account of how the closed flaps of the duff and offal chutes on the vessel could have been forced open by the sea at the time of the incident. (You can also see a model of the design fault captured on this VIDEO clip).

Furthermore, the factor tree analysis diagram, published earlier on THIS PAGE, presented a range of alternative explanations, as to how the outer flaps of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul could have become open and remained in the open position (the RFI having only examined and accepted that the flaps were open, prior to the vessel’s departure from Hull, as a result of corrosion and lack of maintenance).

One of these alternative explanations (i.e. THE SECOND DESIGN FAULT), mentioned in an earlier POST, put forward the possibility that the bolted non-return flap assemblies within the chutes could have become twisted due to wave action and remained open as a result.

Today, we are presenting another alternative explanation, whereby a simple dimensioning error in the shipyard’s construction drawings meant that, if ever the brass gland within the flap hinges was loosened by the operation of the flap, parts of it could have bound together, thus causing the flap to remain seized in the open position.

THIS PAPER gives the details. (The document can also be viewed HERE)

Compliance with the rules (Part II)

In our previous post we indicated several non-compliances with the safety rules pertaining to the construction of the Gaul’s duff and offal chutes.

We are now reporting on further non-compliances with the rules, details of which have been published within this DOCUMENT.

Back garden model testing

At the end of the 2004 RFI, the wreck commissioner opined:

“[…] it is important to note that although both chutes were found on the wreck to be open both in way of the non-return flap and the internal top cover, there is no known mechanical reason why this was so.” [1]

This viewpoint has recently been echoed by the the Treasury Solicitor who said:

“there was no evidence that the chutes had been forced open by wave or water action so this was not advanced as a loss scenario by the experts”

Having enjoyed the benefits of a sunny weekend, we decided to construct a small-scale (and cheap) model of the chutes and test them with a hose. The results of this simple experiment provide a clear illustration of the SCENARIO whereby the design fault in the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul caused the flooding and loss of the vessel.

Simple mechanics!

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[1] Report of the Re-opened Formal Investigation into the Loss of the FV Gaul

Back garden modelling of the Gaul chutes
Uploaded by gadflymotion531

(The video file can be dowloaded from this SITE (2.9 Mb))

A few essential details that went missing

In any major and costly marine accident investigation, such as the Gaul RFI, one would normally expect lots of data and information relevant to the identified cause of the tragedy to emerge and be made available.
Yet, looking at the government website: www.fv-gaul.org.uk, the sole repository of official information on the Gaul case, one cannot help wondering why so little was published about those things that were pertinent and central to the loss of the vessel, while many tangential issues were generously treated.

Anyway, to make up for the government’s oversight, we have taken it upon ourselves to publish some ADDITIONAL DATA from the vessel’s design plans together with a few detail views of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul.

These diagrams, apart from adding clarity to the general arrangements on the Gaul and the construction of its chutes, also show that the RFI panel’s claim, that maintenance of the Gaul’s flap assemblies was not possible, is clearly not correct. [This latter aspect has, in fact, already been covered in the full TECHNICAL REPORT.]

Loose ends

In the his opening speech to the Gaul Re-opened Formal Investigation, Nigel Meeson QC, representing the Attorney General, advised on one of the matters on which the RFI should focus:

“…the duff chute …This time a single flap lid, which we can see, is in the open position. It is difficult to see, but if one looks carefully you can see that the chute here is kept in the open position by a wire pinned across the top left-hand corner, which I am indicating now with the laser pen.”

This matter was to become one of the RFI’s principal justifications for concluding that the inner covers of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul had been secured open by the crew, a fact that was subsequently deemed to have contributed to the loss of the vessel. [1]

The image taken during the 2002 underwater survey, that Mr Meeson referred to, purportedly shows a wire going across the inner lid.

We have also viewed this picture, as well as the rest of the video footage, and have come to a different conclusion, which we now present in this DOCUMENT.

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[1] The RFI also found that the fact that the outer flaps were found open had been due to corrosion and lack of maintenance. Please see our earlier posts on this issue.

Another small observation

The 2004 Formal Investigation into the sinking of the FV Gaul concluded, as we all already know, that the cause for the loss of the vessel was the ingress of a large quantity of seawater through the two duff and offal chutes openings in the hull of the vessel.

The double-barrier protections of these openings – the inner covers and the outer flaps - were found to be in the open position during the underwater survey in 2002.
The fact that the outer flaps were found open, the investigation concluded, was due to seizure caused by corrosion in the vessel’s 16 month old flap hinges and failure on the part of the crew and shore maintenance staff to identify and rectify this problem.
The fact that the inner covers were also found open was explained away by crew negligence.
However, the trouble with these findings (as we have attempted to explain in our earlier posts) is that they were based on unsubstantiated assumptions.

Let’s take, this time, the presumed corrosion at the flap hinges. (For a few more details on this issue please click HERE.)
As the same combination of materials, mild steel and brass, had been used in a number of other structures on the Gaul (e.g. for the toggles and clips on all weathertight hatches and doors), one would expect similar corrosion problems in those areas.
In reality, though, this doesn’t seem to be the case.
Quite the reverse, as the following clips[1] show, even after 28 years under the sea, the toggles and clips on the Gaul did not present such a level of corrosion and seizure that would prevent them from being easily unscrewed by the ROV[2] arm.

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[1] Extracts from the 2002 MAIB video footage - © Crown copyright
[2] Remote Operated Vehicle

weathertight hatch mild-steel clips & brass bush

weathertight hatch brass toggle & steel toggle bolt

weathertight hatch brass toggle & steel toggle bolt

The second design fault

In our previous post we provided a LINK to a factor tree diagram, which presented the various alternative explanations as to why the outer non-return flaps in the duff and offal chutes were found in the open position during the 2002 underwater survey on the Gaul.

We have also published a simple pictorial explanation of the PRIMARY DESIGN FAULT in the vessel's chutes.

Now we are publishing a document, which reveals a second design fault in the construction of these chutes (please click SECOND DESIGN FAULT or HERE to find out more).

This additional design fault, demonstrated in the above-mentioned paper, gives weight to the possibility that the bolted flap assemblies within the duff and offal chutes became twisted due to wave loading and remained open thereafter. (See item (14) on the factor tree diagram).

Are the conclusions arrived at by the Gaul investigation panel (i.e. that the vessel’s chutes had been left open by the crew and shore staff for 59 days before the accident occurred) supported by any credible proof?

The main design defect

For a pictorial explanation of the design defect on the Gaul, please follow this link:
http://webzoom.freewebs.com/inconvenientcitizen/Gaul%20design%20fault.pdf

OR

http://freepdfhosting.com/fb7c5882a5.pdf